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Abstract  
A clash between the police and journalists covering a Falun Gong gathering in Surabaya 
2011 have shown a significant change in understanding the triangular relationship between 
Indonesia, China and the Ethnic Chinese in Indonesia. During the Suharto period, ethnic 
Chinese in Indonesia and China as a foreign state were the problems for the Indonesian 
government. After the political reforms in Indonesia together with the Rise of China in 
2000s, in some situation, it is the Indonesian government together with the Chinese 
government which is the problem for some ethnic Chinese in Indonesia. Ethnic Chinese 
people were seen to be close with China and their loyalty to the nation was doubted. But now 
it is the Indonesian government which is viewed as being too close to China and thus 
harming national integrity, and suspected of being unnationalistic. 
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1． Post 1998 and the May 2011 incident in Indonesia 
 
After the violence against the Chinese in Indonesia that shocked the world in 
1998, redress efforts in Indonesia for the ethnic Chinese have been successful in 
the public arena. The socio-cultural and political rights of the Chinese have been 
restored such that they now have the right to run for Presidency, which used to be 
legally in doubt due to a clause in the constitution stating that the President must 
be asli, or indigenous. This clause was cleared by an amendment to the law on 
citizenship in 2006(Chandra 2008; Matsumura 2009) 1
                                                   
1 On the 2006 Amendment of Citizenship law, the issue was that the 
constitutional clause which stipulates the Indonesian President have to be an 
“Asli”. Thus many understood that by the word “Asli”, the constitution 
excluded not only the former colonial power such as the Dutch and the 
Japanese, but also the ethnic Chinese to become a President. The problem was 
that there was no clear legal definition to the term “Asli” for a long time, thus 
some could argue that the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia were not entitled to 
become a President, because they are not “ethnically native”. Thus the article 
was supplemented by a note that says, “Asli” here does not exclude any 
Indonesians of particular ethnic background, and it means solely that they are 
naturally born as an Indonesian. Thus, to seal any legal doubt that the ethnic 
. Together with other 
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reforms toward political freedom in Indonesia, the Chinese/China problem during 
the Suharto period, in which ethnic Chinese were often blamed by the 
government for foreign subversive acts, for economic disparity and for social 
disharmony is becoming a thing of the past. Political reforms and efforts by both 
Indonesian government and ethnic Chinese social organization in Indonesia since 
1998 have led to very important historical changes, securing the civil rights of 
Chinese Indonesians not achieved by previous governments. And as far as its 
legal status is concerned, the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia were not a “problem” as 
it had been in many ways during the Suharto era2
 
. 
In 2011, a leading Indonesian media, Tempo, on May 9th and a leading English 
newspaper in Indonesia, The Jakarta Post, on May 10th, both covered a small, but 
a rare story. Lukman Abdul Rozaq, a cameraman from Trans7 who was covering 
a Falun Gong march in Surabaya on May 7th, 2011, was quoted as saying: 
"Suddenly, police in plain clothes attacked the crowd with helmets, including the 
journalists. I was hit from behind. I retaliated but the number of policemen in 
uniform was higher."3 Lukman was not the only one to be attacked in the 
incident. TVRI cameraman Joko was also kicked by police officers, Septa 
Rudianto from Radio El Shinta Surabaya and New Tang Dynasty Television 
contributor Eko Oscar Nugroho also had been hit by the police4
 
. 
                                                                                                                                                     
Chinese in Indonesia can become a President. 
2  The successful efforts by the Chinese organization are well described in 
Hoon, C. Y. (2008). Chinese Identity in Post-Suharto Indonesia. Brighton, 
Sussex Academic Press. 
3 Quoted from the following article. Wahyoe Boediwardhana, ‘Police questioned over 
attack on journalists’, The Jakarta Post, May 10th, 2011, Surabaya. 
4 Ibid. 
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After the incident, journalists in Surabaya reacted in protest and requested 
Inspector General Untung Suharsono Radjab, the chief of the East Java Police, to 
review the case. Major journalist groups in Indonesia including the Indonesian 
Journalists Association (PWI:Persatuan Wartawan Indonesia), the Radio 
Indonesia Journalists Alliance (Alwari: Aliansi Wartawan Radio Indonesia), the 
Television Journalists Association (IJTI: Ikatan Jurnalis Televisi Indonesia) and 
the Alliance of Independent Journalists (AJI:Aliansi Jurnalis Independen) joined 
forces to pressure the police chief to investigate. 
 
Interestingly, the Jakarta Post article cited two contrasting comments on this case , 
one by the police and the other by the Chinese embassy. 
First, by the police, 
・・・・・・・・ East Java Police spokesperson Comr. Rachmat Mulyana said 
the restrictions on the movement in Indonesia were apparently upon the request of 
the Chinese government through its envoy in Indonesia. "The movement is 
banned in China. We are concerned that if we allow it to exist, it would have a 
negative impact on the Chinese-Indonesian community in East Java. If it's just a 
parade, it's okay. We respect the relationship between Indonesia and China," 
Rachmat said5
 
. 
And second, by the Chinese embassy, 
……… the Chinese vice consulate in Surabaya, Sun Guo Yuan, denied the 
Chinese government had asked the police in Indonesia to suppress Falun Gong in 
Indonesia. "I absolutely don't know anything about the incident. We were closed 
                                                   
5 Ibid. 
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on Saturday and Sunday so we don't know about the matter at all. And, it is not 
true what they accused us of," Sun said6
 
. 
This police aggression itself might not be special in Indonesia in terms of its size 
and its level of brutality. However, this small case of clash between the police and 
the journalists shed a light on new and a rather larger question. A question on how 
important is it to meet the political demands of China especially with the use of 
force against the Indonesian citizens. Or moreover, how much influence does 
China have in changing Indonesia’s internal governance rules. The above police 
comments have clearly stated that the one of the reason of aggression came from 
the concern over bilateral relationship, whether or not the Chinese embassy had 
requested. As seen in the comments by the Chinese embassy, cited by the Jakarta 
post, is not surprising. Historically speaking, many clashes in Indonesia have 
regarded to have China’s “hand (campur tanggan)” behind, but never proved. 
However, whether it is by request, or by voluntary decision, the reasoning of 
police act to suppress the Indonesian demonstrators and journalists covering the 
event who were not acting against the Jakarta government, is somehow a very 
important incident to note. As a preliminary research on the case, I would like to 
point out two points why I think this is an importance case7
 
. 
Firstly, the above police aggression towards the reporters was not just a matter of 
Falun Gong or freedom of religion. Falun Gong followers took this case seriously 
                                                   
6 Ibid. 
7 A detailed case narrative can be obtained in COMMISSION, A. H. R. (2011). 
"INDONESIA: Surabaya police beat journalists – regional police cover up the 
case." from 
http://www.humanrights.asia/news/urgent-appeals/AHRC-UAC-120-2011. 
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as a violation to their social practices which are not banned in Indonesia. But the 
point that drew attention among the Indonesians was rather on a matter of 
freedom of the press8. Freedom of speech and freedom of the press are considered 
to be one of the major achievements of Indonesia as a democratic nation after 
Suharto. The degree of press freedom in Indonesia is proudly considered to be in 
world standard, especially when compared to other Southeast Asian countries. 
Indonesia, as a rising champion of democracy in the region in recent years, unlike 
Malaysia and Thailand where media reporting has been tightened during recent 
years, has enjoyed unprecedented press freedom in its history9
 
. This incident was 
a major challenge to this freedom of the press, despite it contained no message to 
attack the SBY government per se. This was the first reason why the violent, 
unseemly aggression by the police toward the reporters surprised the public. 
Secondly, and more importantly, despite the denial by the Chinese embassy that it 
had requested the Indonesian authority, the police were thought to be doing a 
favor for the Chinese embassy which had clearly condemned the activities of the 
Falun Gong. Journalists considered the police action have harmed the “national 
                                                   
8 Falun Gong, as opposed to the Chinese government, claim they are not a religious 
group. 
9 Indonesian government, especially under the second term of President SBY, 
has claimed that Indonesia are the champion of Freedom and Democracy in 
Southeast Asia in various occasions. President SBY himself once said that “we 
have awakened our democratic instinct” in a Keynote Speech at The 6th 
Assembly of World Movement for Democracy, April 2010. (Full text in 
http://indonesia.gr/keynote-speech-at-the-6th-assembly-of-world-movement-for
-democracy/) 
 Also, outside Indonesia, various organization judged that Indonesia’s press 
freedom has an impressive standard of freedom. For example, the Freedom 
House report on Freedom of Press, ranked Indonesia, together with Philippines 
as “Partly Free” while other eight ASEAN members all were categorized in 
“Not Free” Reports could be found in, 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-press 
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principle” in which Indonesia takes pride in. In this case, the pride was freedom 
of the press. In a way, it signaled that if a journalist in Indonesia upsets Beijing, 
not Jakarta, an aggression is waiting, an aggression which could be more severe 
than when they attack the Jakarta authority. So it was also a matter of Indonesia 
and China, particularly the influence of Chinese government toward the 
Indonesian authority vs. the Indonesian people. It was not just one another issue 
of a demonstration by a social or religious group, but because of the nature of 
Falun Gong as well, the event raised question on the influence of Chinese 
authority toward Indonesian authority and a question of Indonesia’s political 
freedom as a sovereign nation state in the era of Rise of China. 
 
Taking the above two points into consideration, the larger question here is on how 
would Indonesia manages to deal with the rising political power of China. 
Number of studies had identified the economic growth of China’s impacted on 
the economic arena through its trade and its investment and natural resource 
strategies. Another series of work identified the impact on the diplomatic 
relationship in ASEAN+3 and EAS, APEC and so on. Basically, these work 
clarifies the ways in which the relationship between China and Indonesia have 
developed their interdependency during the last ten years. But in this paper, I 
would like to focus on a different dimension of the two countries. Among the 
large question I mentioned above, the Surabaya 2011 case shows one aspect on 
what way the political power of China would influence the political principle and 
the domestic socio-political environment of Indonesia. 
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2.  Chinese domestic issue becomes an Indonesian domestic issue: 
Roundtable discussion on the Strategic Partnership of Indonesia-PRC, 2005 
 
As far as the Indonesian government is concerned, the issue was not entirely new, 
and had been predicted years ago. In 2006, a meeting organized by the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs discussed the topic of bilateral relationships with China in a 
thorough manner. Specialists from various fields and high-ranking officials 
gathered to review the strategic partnership with China which had been agreed in 
Jakarta six months earlier. The partnership agreement was signed after celebrating 
the 50th anniversary of the Bandung Conference held in 1955, between 
Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Chinese Premier Hu Jintao. 
Thereafter, good relationships between the two countries as central pillars of Asia 
were often mentioned in the newspapers and TV in Indonesia. 
 
The majority of participants at the meeting of 2006 in the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, especially those from industry, tourism, and mining, viewed China or the 
Rise of China as an economic opportunity. The keyword of the discussion was 
“Cooperation (Kerjasama)”10
                                                   
10 Six out of Nine discussion session of this whole meeting were titled with the 
word “Cooperation”, such as “Cooperation on Investment, Monetary and 
Energy”, “Cooperation on Trading”, “Cooperation on Natural resources”, 
“Cooperation on Tourism”, “Cooperation on Education and Social-Culture”, 
“Cooperation on Science and Technology”. 
. Most of the discussions were on economic issues, 
such as the strategy for using the rich natural resources of Indonesia in the 
bilateral relationship, and boasting tourism together as a new emerging market 
that lies between the two countries. Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda was 
quoted as emphasizing the strong economic ties between Indonesia and China. 
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With confidence and high expectation, he shared the prospect that the bilateral 
trade between the two nation will escalate to 30 billion dollars a year by 2010, 
which is almost double size of 2005, 16.8 billion dollars. Coordinating Minister 
of Political, Legal and Security affairs who was attending the roundtable 
discussion was also quoted as “Indonesia should make the use of (memanfaatkan) 
the momentum of Rise of China(Kebangkitan China) for the national 
importance” (Hasyim 2006). Not only the economic ministers but also the 
minister in charge of political and security affairs commented positively on the 
“Rise of China” after the discussion.  
According to the media coverage on this roundtable discussion, economic reasons 
motivated most of the government officials and the Indonesian elite to strengthen 
the relationship between two nation to the next level11
However, if we look into what actually have been discussed, one session of the 
meeting had a complete different tone from the economic “Coopertation” 
regarding political affairs. A speaker from the Ministry of Home Affairs delivered 
a presentation titled “Several Anticipation by the ministry of Home Affairs and 
Local Governments that would emerge in the indonesia-China bilateral 
relationship” in the session “The issues that may wedge in the Bilateral 
relationship of Indonesia and China”. In short, he warned the fellow Indonesian 
. The long history of 
conflict with the Chinese in Indonesia and the pendulum of the relationship 
between the two countries were not reported, possibly because of that the 
government had to maintain its fully positive attitude considering its diplomatic 
impression. 
                                                   
11 These economic arguments may not be new and may not be particular about China, 
and were merely about maximizing the advantages and minimizing the disadvantages 
of deregulation vis-à-vis an emerging economy. 
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government officials that with closer relationships between the two giant 
countries, China’s domestic issues would affect Indonesian politics, and even 
restrain political choices for Indonesia’s domestic policy(Direktorat Jenderal Asia 
dan Pasifik dan Afrika 2006).  
 
So what did he mean by China’s domestic issues? First, the Falun Gong. Despite 
the well-known ban on Falun Gong activities in China, and its strong message 
toward the foreign countries to act in accordance to Beijing’s principle onto the 
group, Indonesia has long loosely allowed their activities. The opening and the 
closure of a radio station in Batam 2005 started to draw attention on the matter in 
Indonesia, and the Falun Gong has gradually become a source of conflict within 
the Indonesian government, how to deal with it. Here, the pattern of conflict was 
beginning to shape between those who take the Beijing’s message at utmost 
importance and those who not. It was not a matter of whether or not the group 
poses any danger within Indonesian society. It was rather about the political 
conflict that would arise from whether the authority should allow their activity in 
Indonesia or not. Since this issue was primarily handled  by the Ministry of 
Home Affairs, the speaker expressed its “anticipation” on the matter. 
   The second concern raised by the Ministry of Home Affairs is on Tibet. In 
June 2006, group of a member of Indonesian foundation “The Roof of the World” 
led by the chairman Mr. Enrico B. Soekarno visited Dharamshala to meet Dalai 
Lama. In the meeting, the delegation passed the invitation for Dalai Lama to visit 
Indonesia from Abdurrahman Wahid, the former President of Indonesia and also 
the head of the largest Muslim community in Indonesia, Nahudatul Ulama. He 
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was the leader of “The Roof of the World”, in organizing religious leader’s 
dialogue. In the meeting, Dalai Lama accepted the offer and planned to visit 
Indonesia in 2007, in an occasion Abdurrahman Wahid organized a “religious 
leader’s dialogue” in Indonesia. 
Third and foremost is the Taiwan issue. Taiwan has always been a major issue in 
Chinese diplomacy. In November 2005, the President of Taiwan, Chen Shui Bian, 
made an emergency landing on the Indonesian island of Batam, which lies just 
across the Malacca straits facing Singapore, because it was declared “running out 
of fuel”. With final approval given by the Governor of Riau Islands, Ismet 
Abdullah, President Chen and his delegation landed. The event took an 
interesting turn when the secretary to the Vice-President, Alwi Hamu, went to 
Batam and greeted Chen and his fellow businessmen from Taiwan; the meeting 
was said to be following an order by the Vice-President in a private capacity12
This meeting angered President Susilo Banbang Yudhoyono, because it prompted 
unnecessary speculation over Indonesia’s One-China policy. This was exactly 
what the Ministry of Home Affairs had wanted to prevent. Only if Indonesia can 
manage the tension between China and Taiwan and benefit from the tension using 
its diplomatic capacity, it is acceptable from the Ministry of Home Affair’s 
standpoint. However, if Indonesia becomes trapped and sandwiched between 
China and Taiwan, it will eventually end up limiting the political freedom of 
Indonesia and will lead to a major loss for the country. In the case of Taiwan 
President Chen’s landing, it affected negatively onto the relationship between the 
President and the vice president. Governor of Riau Islands was severely scolded 
. 
                                                   
12 Regarding the emergency landing, see Luhur Hertanto, ‘Kalla Tegaskan Kedatangan Chen 
Tak Salahi One China Policy’, detik.com May 11th, 2006. 
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by the President, therefore, it damaged the relationship between the central 
government and the local government as well. From the standpoint of the 
Ministry of Home Affairs, these rifts between the Indonesian government 
agencies are both totally unacceptable and unnecessary hence the warning at the 
meeting13
The issues of Falun Gong, Tibet, and Taiwan are in a way, common issues for 
Indonesia. As an official of home affairs have anticipated in his discussion, they 
are China’s domestic issues and are now limiting the domestic political space of 
Indonesia. This was the point that the Ministry of Home Affairs wanted the fellow 
Indonesian government members to be well informed of. The Ministry of home 
Affairs would take a very different position compared to other institutions by 
prioritizing the sovereignty and autonomy of Indonesia from “Chinese influence”. 
The host of the whole meeting, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which naturally 
defines national interest within the international setting, would prioritize good 
relationships with neighboring countries and balanced relationships with foreign 
nations especially with the strong China rather than the religious or political 
freedom of domestic supporters of Falun Gong, Taiwan or Tibet. 
. 
 
In the history of Indonesia, the Taiwan/China issue has been a major political 
choice among the military generals and powerful politicians and officials. The 
conflict was magnified by domestic rivalry between the communists and 
anti-communists during the Cold War era in Asia especially in the 1950s and 
                                                   
13 Regarding the details of this roundtable discussion, I have described in a report 
submitted to “2006－2007 JETRO Research group on “The analysis on China’s economic 
and diplomatic strategy and the future state of East Asia”. 
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1960s.. In the early 1960s, after the PRRI/PERMESTA, Indonesia had difficult 
relations with Taiwan and moved closer to Beijing. Because Sukarno government 
judged that Taiwan was behind the PRRI/PERMESTA movement. However, after 
the G30S coup attempt in 1965, Indonesia turned against Beijing and improved 
relations with Taiwan14
 
. The historical experience of severe impacts on domestic 
society created by changes in foreign relations, especially with China, as well as 
the obvious differences in principles among different ministries with regard to 
relationship-building with China, has led the Ministry of Home Affairs to warn 
the government about today’s optimistic and euphoric relationship between 
Indonesia and China. Especially, in this roundtable discussion meeting where 
majority of government official talks about strategy in the sense that Indonesia 
should take full economic benefit from the rise of China, without taking the 
political and social risks that comes together. 
3. Problematizing the government, not the people: a major shift 
 
During the Suharto period, the Indonesian term Masalah Cina was used for three 
                                                   
14 PRRI (Pemerintahan Revolusioner Republik Indonesia: Revolutionary Government for the 
Republic of Indonesia) refers to the conflict among military commanders seeking autonomy in 
Sumatra in the late 1950s, and Permesta (Piagam Perjuangan Semesta: Charter for Universal 
Struggle) is another action taken mainly in Sulawesi. In this conflict, the Sukarno government 
asserted that the “rebels” were receiving support from the Kuomintang of Taiwan, thus after 
the end of the “rebellion”, Taiwan was condemned by the Sukarno government for its 
subversive acts. Mossman, J. (1961). Rebels in Paradise, Indonesia's Civil War. London, 
Jonathan Cape. The changes in diplomatic relationship between Indonesia and China/Taiwan 
is detailed in Mozingo, D. (1981). China’s Policy toward Indonesia 1949-1967. Ithaca, Cornell 
University Press. and Hong, L. (2011). China and Shaping of Indonesia, 1949-1965. Kyoto, 
Kyoto University Press. 
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subcategories of problem: the problem of China as a state, the Chinese as both 
foreign and domestic people, and Chinese culture. These were problems for the 
government and for the state, which was defined to serve its political 
needs(Aizawa 2010). 
Put simply, during the Suharto period and in certain moments during the 
previous administration, when we talk about issues on Cina, in Indonesia, it was 
the people, the ethnic Chinese, who were the problem for the government.  
For example, in 1966, after the G30S coup attempt in Indonesia, ethnic 
Chinese were regarded by the new government led by Suharto of being 
suspicious of being too close to Beijing which then, the Suharto-led-Government 
saw as a foreign country opposing to setup the new Suharto regime. For Suharto, 
Beijing was a political obstacle, and also the ethnic Chinese were positioned 
within Indonesian society as a suspicious group unknown of their loyalty to the 
nation. Surabaya, where the Falun Gong incident took place in 2011, was in 1966, 
a place where then regional military commander Sumitro had taken severe 
measures toward the ethnic Chinese residents. He forced them to move out of the 
rural area to the urban centers such as Surabaya, stripping off their business 
license, and encouraging them to leave from Indonesia. But now, it is the 
government which is the problem for Indonesian people for its unpatriotic 
attitudes.  
 
Before, the Chinese people seemed to be close with China and their loyalty to the 
nation was doubted; sometimes they were viewed as potentially subversive or the 
root cause of social disharmony. Therefore the ethnic Chinese were in the 
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position to always “prove” that they are, with no doubt, Indonesians both legally 
and culturally. It could be that, in the near future, the Indonesian authority to be 
positioned in a place to continuously prove they are more loyal to the Indonesian 
people than to the Beijing government. This reversal, or inverted position of the 
state and the people on the Chinese/China problem, seems to be a shift for the 
first time in the long history of the China/Chinese problem in Indonesia. In 
certain moments, the ties between the two governments seem to be closer than the 
ties between the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia and China. Or the reality could be 
that the Chinese government’s pressure toward the domestic issue in Indonesia is 
gaining a new level.  
 
The incident in Surabaya in 2011 suggests a small but a fundamental change in 
the structure of the triangular relationship among the Indonesian government, the 
Chinese government and the Indonesian people. Governments used to be 
suspicious about their own people. But now the government needs to defend itself 
against the suspicions of its people as to whether they are pro-people or not. A 
comparison of the Suharto period and post-Suharto period reveals an interesting 
difference on this issue. The interesting thing is not merely the diplomatic level 
such as the change of Chinese government’s approach toward the Indonesian 
government, nor the ethnic Chinese’s civil and social rights. It is rather the shift 
in who disparages who, i.e. before it was the government and the non-Chinese 
Indonesians who disparaged the ethnic Chinese, but now, it is the ethnic Chinese 
and the non-Chinese Indonesians who disparage the government. It is the 
government which is viewed as being too close to China and thus harming 
17 
 
national integrity, and which is suspected of being unpatriotic, by favoring China 
rather than its own people. It could be the cleavages within the government which 
is caused by different standpoints regarding the issues on China that creates social 
disharmony. Among the various changes regarding the ethnic Chinese in 
Indonesia that took place during the time of political reforms in Indonesia 
together with the economic and political rise of China, this Surabaya case 
suggests that the whole dimension of politics of disparaging the ethnic Chinese in 
Indonesia in the past, is changing.15
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
15 This is not to claim that the so-called historical Chinese/China problem has been 
completely solved in Indonesia. As far as the legality of the issue, Chinese Indonesians 
have gained both the same rights and responsibilities as other Indonesians, but it is too 
early to say whether equality has been achieved in social life both for ethnic Chinese 
and for non-Chinese. 
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